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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs, 
DIMITRIOS DESLIS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF 
Case No. 980269-CA 
ARGUMENT 
THE CITY FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONDUCT OF APPELLANT 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE HARBORING OR CONCEALING UNDER THE 
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE ORDINANCE 
The City argues that there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the trial court could have found Appellant to be harboring or 
concealing the offender under subsection (b) of the ordinance. 
Appellant refers this Court to its opening brief regarding this 
argument. Furthermore, Appellant submits that an affirmative act is 
necessary in order to be convicted under this section. 
In 1972, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of State 
v. Ludlow, 28 Utah 2d 434, 503 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1972), attached as 
Exhibit I. That case involved an employer charged with Obstruction 
of Justice for failing to bring an employee out of the factory so 
she could be served with judicial process. Id. The court in Ludlow 
held that such conduct did not constitute Obstruction of Justice. 
Appellant submits that failing to produce the employee did involves 
an affirmative act on the part of the employer, yet the court still 
did not qualify that action as consituting Obstruction of Justice. 
Appellant submits that if such an affirmative act on the 
part of the defendnat in Ludlow cannot be sufficient to constitute 
an offense of Obstruction of Justice, neither can the passive 
refusal of Appellant to give information to the officers in the 
instant case. 
Similarly, Appellant cites to a California Supreme Court 
case for proposition held in Ludlow, supra. In People v. Wetzel, 
520 P.2d 416 (Cal. 1974), attached as Exhibit II, the court held 
-2-
that the defendant's actions of standing in her doorway and 
refusing the officer's request to enter and search for a suspect, 
did not constitute obstruction of justice. 
The court in Itfetzel, further agreed with defendant's 
contention that she committed no offense by "passively asserting a 
constitutional right." Id. at 417. The court concluded that "the 
defendant's total conduct cannot be characterized other than a 
refusal to consent to a request to enter her apartment. Such 
conduct cannot constitute grounds for a lawful arrest . . ." Id. at 
419. Appellant submits that his conduct is actually less agregious 
than the conduct exhibited by Wetzel, and that he, too, was 
asserting a valid constitutional right. 
The City argues that Appellant had no constitutional 
rights to assert, however, Appellant has already argued in his 
Opening Brief to the contrary. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests 
this Court reverse his conviction, based upon the fact that the 
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evidence presented was not sufficient for a finding of Obstruction 
of Justice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 1998. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, postage 
prepaid, this day of November, 1998, to: 
Augustus G. Chin 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
451 South 200 East 
Room 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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deponents on whose evidence the infor-
mation or indictment was based shall be 
indorsed thereon before it is presented, 
and the prosecuting attorney shall in-
dorse on the information or indictment 
at such time as the court may by rule or 
otherwise prescribe the names of such 
other witnesses as he proposes to call. 
A failure to so indorse the said names 
shall not affect the validity or sufficien-
cy of the information or indictment, but 
the court in which the information or in-
dictment was filed shall, upon application 
of the defendant, direct the names of 
such witnesses to be indorsed. No con-
tinuance shall be allowed because of the 
failure to indorse any of the said names 
unless such application was made at the 
earliest opportunity and then only if a 
continuance is necessary in the interest 
of justice. 
This section clearly provides that if the 
prosecutor proposes to call witnesses other 
than those who testified at the preliminary 
hearing and fails to place their names on 
the information, the court shall direct him 
to do so upon application of the defendant. 
Besides the lack of error in the delay in 
writing the additional names on the infor-
mation, the prosecutor had furnished a bill 
of particulars to counsel for the appellant, 
wherein he stated that he would call 
George Perry Lang as a witness. 
[4] During the trial the prosecutor 
called the chief of police as a witness for 
the purpose of laying a foundation for in-
troducing certain exhibits in evidence; and 
since the chief had access to the locker 
where those exhibits were kept, the prose-
cutor thought it proper to show that the 
witness had not tampered with those exhib-
its while awaiting trial. The name of this 
witness had not been placed upon the in-
formation nor given in the bill of particu-
lars. 
We are unable to see how any prejudice 
resulted from permitting the witness to tell 
the jury that he had not tampered with the 
evidence, or in the failure of the prosecu-
tor to place his name on the information 
before trial started. 
We find no error and, therefore, affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
CALLISTER, C J., and TUCKETT, 
HENRIOD, and CROCKETT, ]]., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER STSTE^, 
28 Utah 2d 434 
STATE of Utah, Plaint i f f and Appellant, 
v. 
Roy S. LUDLOW, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 12981. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 1, 1972. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, D. Frank Wilkins, J., entered judg-
ment quashing information charging de-
fendant with obstructing an officer in per-
forming his duty, and State appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that trial 
court did not err in quashing the informa-
tion, where information was based on de-
fendant's refusal to bring a female em-
ployee out of factory so that deputy sheriff 
could serve her with a small claims court 
order, and where defendant had no objec-
tion to service during various work breaks, 
including coffee, but did object to service 
during working hours on ground that 
manufacture work in question involved 
dangers if impeded. 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., concurred in result. 
Obstructing Justice C=>7 
Quashing of information charging de-
fendant with obstructing an officer in per-
forming his duty was not error, where in-
formation was based on defendant's refusal 
to bring female employee out of factory so 
STATE v. 
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that deputy sheriff could serve her with 
a small claims court order, and where de-
fendant had no objection to service during 
various work breaks, including coffee, but 
did object to service during working hours 
on ground that manufacture work in ques-
tion involved dangers if impeded. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-28-54. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., William 
T. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Carl J. Xemel-
ka, Salt Lake County Atty., Donald Sawaya, 
Larry R. Keller, Asst. County Att>s., Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Paul X. Cotro-Manes, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from a judgment quashing an 
information. Affirmed. 
The State says that Ludlow obstructed an 
officer in performing his duty.1 This was 
based on a refusal to bring a female em-
ployee out of the factory so that a deputy 
sheriff could serve her with a Small Claims 
Court order. At preliminary examination 
it was unrefuted that Ludlow had no ob-
jection to the service during the various 
work breaks, including coffee, but not dur-
ing working hours, where boat manufacture 
work involved dangers if work were im-
peded. Words flew between the deputy 
and the employer which prevented the dove 
of peace from lighting on either's shoulders, 
where there remained but chips. Each may 
have suffered hurt feelings. 
The briefs said a lot about the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, favorite topics at 
the bridge club, local taverns and the 
Supreme Court, all about searches and sei-
zures, cabbages and kings and the like 
which fashion the American scene,—but it 
appears that the deputy here unduly pressed 
his prestige with its attendant duty and 
authority, considering that it could have 
been displayed at the lunch hour, at a coffee 
LUDLOW Utah 1 2 H 
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break, or a rest period in such fashion that 
its eminence would not have been can-
vassed in this court. 
The distinctions indulged in the briefs 
about statutory and common law, dwellings, 
and curtilages, searches and seizures, 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
the like need not decide this case. We 
know of no rule and don't intend to initiate 
one, where immediacy, necessity, threatened 
flight or anything else that might interrupt 
normal business activities, where another 
avenue for serving process is available, 
would compel an employer to "produce" 
his employee as the state claims he must, 
to satisfy the arbitrary and self-determined 
approach chosen by the process server to 
serve his own convenience. Such a rule 
might subject an employer to a false arrest 
confrontation if he dragged his employee 
through an assemblage of co-workers into 
the front office to face not only a law-
man's badge but the humiliation arising by 
innuendo incident thereto pointing to some 
kind of wrong-doing. We do not think 
such a situation comports with the mores 
of a give and take democracy. 
We believe and hold that under the cir-
cumstances of this particular case the trial 
court did not err. Without being unduly 
philosophical, we might suggest that had 
tempers not flared, this case would not 
have been here. We are not constrained to 
use the facts of this case to render a 
declaratory judgment in what appears to be 
a test case which perhaps is travelling along 
the wrong track. We think Ludlow may 
have been a mite more cooperative, and the 
deputy a smidgeon less insistent, but they 
weren't, and who isn't these days,—and we 
think that neither had any wrongful intent, 
—but simply played the role of umpire and 
fan at the ball game of usuality. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT and 
CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, J., concurs in the result. 
I. Title 76-2S-34, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
EXHIBIT II 
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tions into criminal activity; yet as noted 
above, subdivision (b) of the statute ex-
pressly directs him to consult that source 
in determining eligibility for diversion. 
Secondly, the decision of the district at-
torney that a defendant is ineligible on 
this ground is subject to judicial review 
at the proper time. A pretrial writ of 
mandate or prohibition will not lie, as the 
determination is purely preliminary and 
there is no indication the Legislature in-
tended the prosecution to be interrupted 
for interlocutory review of this issue 
(compare Pen.Code, §§ 999a, 1538.5).5 
But if the defendant goes to trial and is 
convicted, he may raise on appeal the 
question whether there was "evidence," 
as defined herein, of his commission of 
other narcotics offenses within the mean-
ing of subsection (3) of subdivision ( a ) ; 6 
if the defendant prevails, the judgment 
must be set aside and the case remanded 
to permit the trial court to exercise its 
discretion to divert the defendant under 
the remaining portions of the statute. 
[3] We conclude that the preliminary 
screening for eligibility conducted by the 
district attorney pursuant to section 1000, 
based on information peculiarly within his 
knowledge and in accordance with stan-
ards prescribed by the statute, does not 
constitute an exercise of judicial author-
ity and hence does not violate the con-
stitutional requirement of separation of 
powers.7 
The alternative writ is discharged and 
peremptory writ is denied. 
5. In the case at bar we permitted the issue to 
be raised by petition for extraordinary writ 
because of the need for a prompt and definitive 
resolution of this constitutional challenge to 
a new statutory program. (Cf. San Francisco 
Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal. 
3d 937, 944-945, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 
669.) 
6. In order for this review to be effective, of 
course, an adequate record is necessary. Ac-
cordingly, at the time the district attorney de-
termines the defendant is ineligible for diver-
sion he should serve on the defendant and file 
WRIGHT, C. J., and McCGMB, TO-
BRINER, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ., 
concur. 
CLARK, Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the judgment and that part 
of the opinion stating the district attor-
ney's determination of eligibility under 
section 1000 is not a judicial act. 
O I KEY HUMBCft STSUM. 
113 Cal.Rptr. 32 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Res pond tut, 
v. 
Sherrie Jean WETZEL, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Cr. 16914. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
April 4, 1974. 
Defendant was convicted in the Supe-
rior Court, Los Angeles County, Richard 
F. C. Hayden, J., of possession of restrict-
ed dangerous drugs, and she appealed, con-
tending that her arrest and subsequent 
search were unlawful. The Supreme Court, 
Wright, C. J., held that defendant who 
stood in doorway of apartment and who 
refused to give consent to officers who re-
quested permission to enter to search for 
juvenile suspected of breaking window did 
with the court a declaration stating the ground 
upon which that determination is based and 
the evidence in support thereof. 
7. The presence of these statutory standards 
also refutes defendant's final claim that sec-
tion 1000 denies him due process of law; and 
inasmuch as the resulting ineligibility of per-
sons who ha\e a history of drug abuse or 
crimes of violence is rationally related to the 
purposes of this legislation identified in On 
Tai Ho (ante, p. 23 of 113 Cal.Rptr., p. 
407 of 520 P.2d), no denial of equal protection 
is shown. 
PEOPLE 7. 
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not thereby obstruct officer in perform-
ance of his duties. 
Reversed. 
Clark, J., filed dissenting opinion in 
which McComb and Burke, JJ., joined. 
Opinion, Cal.App., 106 Cal.Rptr. 651, 
vacated. 
Cal. 417 
I. Obstructing Justice <§=>7 
Defendant who stood in doorway of 
apartment and who refused to give consent 
to officers who requested permission to en-
ter to search for juvenile suspected of 
breaking window did not thereby obstruct 
officer in performance of his duties. 
West's Ann.Pen.Code, § 148. 
2. Arrest <§=>68 
Where citizen informant had provided 
officers with fresh information which had 
been proved to be reliable, officers did not 
need search warrant to enter apartment in 
hot pursuit of criminal suspect based on in-
formant's belief that suspect had entered 
apartment. 
Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under ap-
pointment by the Supreme Court, and 
Kathleen J. Kirkland, Alhambra, under ap-
pointment by the Court of Appeal, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward 
A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Wil-
liam E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman 
H. Sokolow, Frederick R. Millar, Jr., and 
Beverly K. Falk, Deputy Attys. Gen., for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
WRIGHT, Chief Justice. 
[1] Defendant appeals from a judg-
ment (order granting probation) entered 
•• All statutory references, unless otherwise 
indicated, are to sections of the Penal Code. 
Defendant has preserved her right to ap-
peal on the issue presented notwithstanding 
her guilty plea. (See §§ 1237, 1237.5, 153S.5, 
subd. (m).) She was initially charged with 
violations of section 148 and Health and Safe-
ty Code section 11910 and entered not guilty 
Pleas. Her motion for dismissal pursuant 
to section 995 was denied, and her motion 
for suppression of evidence pursuant to sec-
520 P 2d—27 
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P 2d 416 
upon a plea of guilty of possession of Sec-
onal, a restricted dangerous drug. (Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11910.) She contends that 
she was unlawfully arrested for obstruct-
ing an officer in the performance of his 
duties (Pen.Code, § 148) when she passive-
ly asserted a constitutional right, and that 
contraband discovered during a search of 
her person pursuant to the arrest was un-
lawfully received in evidence. We agree 
with defendant's contentions. As the con-
traband was the sole evidence of defend-
ant's guilt the judgment must be reversed.1 
At approximately 4 a. m. on a date in 
May 1971 police officers responded to a 
burglary alarm in the vicinity of defend-
ant's apartment. They were informed by a 
citizen in the neighborhood that he had ob-
served the flight of three juveniles after 
they had smashed the window of a- store 
building. One of the juveniles had gone to 
a nearby parking lot, and the officers ap-
prehended a suspect at the lot. 
The citizen informer reported that he 
was of the opinion that a second suspect 
entered defendant's apartment. Two offi-
cers went to the apartment and, through a 
partially open door, observed several per-
sons asleep inside. An officer knocked on 
the door, awoke defendant, advised her of 
the circumstances and requested permission 
to enter the apartment and search for the 
suspect. Defendant told the officers to 
"Get the hell out of here if you don't have 
a damn warrant." An officer explained 
that they did not need a warrant in the cir-
cumstances, but defendant nevertheless 
continued to refuse permission to enter. 
During the course of the conversation de-
fendant, who was fully clothed, stepped off 
the bed pnto the interior threshold of the 
tion 1538.5, submitted on the transcript of 
proceedings had at the preliminary hearing 
and additional testimony, was likewise denied. 
Thereafter she withdrew her plea of not 
guilty as to the possession charge and en-
tered a guilty plea. The obstructing charge 
was dismissed in the interest of justice, pro-
ceedings were suspended and defendant was 
placed on probation for a period of five years. 
This appeal followed. 
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open doorway. She was next threatened 
with arrest for obstructing an officer in 
carrying out his duties, but she remained 
adamant in the absence of a warrant. An 
officer then seized defendant, turned her 
around and put handcuffs on her. The of-
ficers then entered and a search of the 
apartment failed to reveal the suspect.2 
At no time during the foregoing events 
did defendant in any way physically con-
front the officers, limiting her objections 
to verbal abuse and protests and standing 
passively in the doorway during the verbal 
exchange.3 She offered no physical resist-
ance to either her arrest or the officers' 
entry. Following the arrest she was re-
moved to a police station where a booking 
search of her person disclosed the chal-
lenged contraband. 
The crux of defendant's contention is 
that her acts were nothing more than a 
passive assertion of a constitutional right 
and that such acts cannot form the basis 
for criminal conduct. If her conduct did 
not constitute grounds for her arrest then, 
of course, the search of her person was an 
invasion of her Fourth Amendment rights 
and the evidence seized should have been 
suppressed. (Wong Sun v. United States 
(1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 
9 L.Ed.2d 441.) 
[2] Preliminarily it should be stated that 
the officers were clearly correct in their 
2. The suspect was not found in the apart-
ment but was later apprehended in the im-
mediate vicinity thereof. From their position 
at the door the officers could observe the 
whole of the interior of the one-room apart-
ment except for the bathroom. 
The foregoing account of events leading to 
defendant's arrest is, as it must be for pur-
poses of appellate review, consistent with 
the testimony of the People's witnesses. 
Defendant's version is somewhat different. 
She testified that when she was aroused 
from her sleep officers were already in the 
apartment and the door, which she had closed 
before retiring, was open. The officers did 
not explain their presence other than to 
advise that she was being placed under arrest 
for burglary. In this connection, at the 
preliminary hearing the arresting officer tes-
tified that defendant's statement to him was 
"get the hell out of here if you don't have" 
a warrant. (Italics added.) 
assertion that they did not need a search 
warrant in order to enter an apartment in 
hot pursuit of a criminal suspect. The cit-
izen informant had provided them with 
fresh information which had already been 
proved to be reliable. (See Warden v. 
Hayden (1967), 387 U.S. 294, 298, 87 S.Ct. 
1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782; People v. Gilbert 
(1965), 63 Cal.2d 690, 706, 47 Cal.Rptr. 
909, 408 P.2d 365.) The critical issue, 
however, is whether the officers were in 
fact obstructed in carrying out their right 
to enter without a warrant. 
The People take the position that be-
cause the trial court found on substantial 
evidence that there was probable cause to 
arrest defendant for a violation of section 
148, the issue of the propriety of her arrest 
is foreclosed. They argue that defendant's 
obstruction of the officers consisted of the 
mere act of standing in an open doorway 
in such a manner that she would have had 
to be pushed aside in order that the offi-
cers might have made an entry. The Peo-
ple concede that defendant had the right to 
refuse her consent, but claim that her ac-
tions "went beyond a mere refusal to con-
sent and actually amounted to a deliberate 
resistance, delay and obstruction" because 
the officers "having once determined that 
their reinforcements were in position 
. . . had to move [defendant] before 
they could enter." 4 
3. Testimony elicited at the hearing upon 
the motion to suppress under section 1538.5 
disclosed that one of the two officers who 
confronted defendant was 35 years of age, 
6 feet 2 inches tall and weighed 217 pounds. 
The other officer was 37 years of age, 6 feet 
tall and weighed 220 pounds. Defendant was 
22 years of age, 5 feet 2 inches in height 
and weighed 117 pounds. 
4. Although the officers might have properly 
entered in hot pursuit of the suspect it ap-
pears that they elected not to do so and 
continued to seek defendant's consent to 
their entry up to the very moment of her 
arrest. During the period of confrontation 
other officers took positions outside the 
ground-level apartment where they might ap-
prehend the suspect should the entry cause 
him to attempt to flee the vicinity. 
PEOPLE v. 
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There can be no question that defendant 
could have exercised her right of refusal 
to a requested entry by officers, and the 
People so concede. According to the Peo-
ple's witnesses she was repeatedly request-
ed to give her consent to the entry and, as 
a reason why she should give such consent, 
it was argued to her that the officers could 
nevertheless effect an entry without that 
consent. But at no time prior to defend-
ant's arrest did the officers actually at-
tempt or state that they intended to make 
such an entry. Nor is there any substan-
tial evidence which would support a con-
clusion that had the officers attempted to 
exercise their right to enter because they 
were in hot pursuit defendant would have 
physically resisted.5 Defendant's entire 
course of conduct was directed to refusal 
of consent, and nothing more. Although 
she had positioned herself in the open 
doorway, it appeared to be the only posi-
tion she could assume while conversing 
with the officers.8 Had she complied with 
the officer's requests and stood back from 
the doorway this in itself would have, un-
der the circumstances, constituted the very 
consent which she was not required to 
give. (See People v. Cressey (1970), 2 
Cal.3d 836, 841, 87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d 
19.) We conclude accordingly, and as a 
matter of law, that defendant's total con-
duct cannot be characterized other than a 
refusal to consent to a request to enter her 
apartment. Such conduct cannot constitute 
grounds for a lawful arrest or subsequent 
search and seizure. 
In People v. Cressey, supra, 2 Cal.3d 836, 
87 Cal.Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d 19 the defendant 
refused to open the door of his residence 
on demand of an officer with grounds to 
WETZEL Cal. 419 
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make a lawful arrest, and therefore with 
grounds to force an entry. We stated in 
that case that the defendant was not re-
quired to open the door on demand there-
for and, quoting from Tompkins v. Superi-
or Court (1963), 59 Cal.2d 65 at page 68, 
27 Cal.Rptr. 889 at page 891, 378 P.2d 113 
at page 115, further stated: " 'If refusal of 
permission to enter could convert mere 
suspicion of crime into probable cause to 
arrest . . ., such suspicion alone would 
become the test of the right to enter, and 
the right to be free from unreasonable po-
lice intrusions would be vitiated by its 
mere assertion.' . . . Refusal to open 
the door is obviously not a public offense. 
(Pen.Code, §§ 69, 148.)" (People v. Cres-
sey, supra, 2 Cal.3d 836, 841-842, fn. 6, 87 
Cal.Rptr. 699, 703, 471 P.2d 19, 23.) 
Cressey thus suggests that the refusal to 
open a door on proper police demand can-
not constitute a violation of section 148, 
and it requires no extension in principle to 
hold in the instant case that the refusal to 
stand aside and permit a requested entry, 
even when officers as in Cressey had a 
right to force an entry, likewise cannot 
constitute a violation of section 148. The 
People, however, argue that Cressey is in-
applicable because in that case the defend-
ant was entitled to remain passive and 
could not be compelled to take the demand-
ed affirmative action in cooperation with 
the police. In the instant case, the People 
contend, defendant did not merely remain 
passive; she interposed herself in the 
doorway and thus created an additional ob-
stacle which had not been present when the 
officers arrived at the doorway. 
The People's distinction of Cressey 
would be valid if, contrary to the undisput-
5. The officer who carried on the verbal ex-
change with defendant testified as follows: 
"Q. Whatever occurred between jou and 
[defendant] at the door did not bar you 
from making an entry and bar you from 
making a search; you performed your du-
ties as jou desired to do them? A. Yes, 
1
 did. . . . Q. Did she make any state-
ments indicating to you that you were going 
to have to move her out of the way? A. 
Not in those exact words. Q. In other 
words, she was just sajing words to the 
effect that she had said earlier, 'You're not 
going in here unless you ha\e a warrant' 
or majbe language a little more uuladjlike? 
A. Yes, sir." 
6. The bed from which defendant arose was 
immediately to her left, and the door in its 
open position was immediately on her right, 
as she faced the officers at the doorway. 
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ed facts in this case, defendant had blocked 
the doorway and impeded the officers in 
making an entry in hot pursuit Here, 
however, the officers awoke defendant 
from a sound sleep and stood at the door-
way while they made repeated requests of 
her There is no substantial evidence m 
support of any conclusion other than that 
she came to the doorway only in response 
to the officers' attempts to discuss the 
question of their entry and persuade her to 
give consent The record thus fails to sup-
port the factual basis for the People's dis-
tinction of Cressey 7 
It is immaterial in the view we take of 
the case that defendant's insistence on a 
warrant was not well founded She had 
the right to withhold consent to enter and, 
as long as entry was not sought on any 
other ground than with her consent she 
committed no impropriety and certainly not 
a violation of section 148 (See District 
of Columbia v Little (1950), 339 U S 1, 
5-6, 70 S Ct 468, 94 L E d 599, Miller v 
United States (5th Cir 1956), 230 F2d 
486, 487-488) 
Defendant's arrest being unlawful, the 
search and seizure which followed were 
also unlawful and the contraband evidence 
should have been suppressed 
The judgment is reversed 
7. In fact, it affirmatively appears that the 
entry was delayed by design and not by any 
volitional conduct of defendant One officer 
testified at the preliminary hearing that 
approximately 10 minutes elapsed from the 
time he arrived at the apartment until he 
arrested defendant The officers delajed un 
til back up units were positioned and then 
entered without opposition 
1. In an appeal under Penal Code section 
1538 5, subdivision (m), the record must, of 
course, be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the party prevailing below (See People 
v Superior Court (Peck) (1974), 10 Cal 3d 
645, 649, 111 CalRptr 565 517 P2d 829 
People v Lazier (1973), 9 Cal 3d 156, 160, 
107 CalRptr 13, 507 P2d 621, People v 
West (1970), 3 Cal 3d 595, 602, 91 Cal 
Rptr 3S5, 477 P 2d 409) 
2. "Q Where did [defendant] stand in rela 
tion to that threshold** A Just in front of 
TOBRINER, MOSK and SULLIVAN, 
JJ , concur 
CLARK, Justice (dissenting) 
I dissent The majority concedes that 
blocking a doorway is a violation of Penal 
Code section 148 if an officer is thereby 
wilfully impeded from making an entry in 
hot pursuit (Ante, p 419) Therefore, 
defendant's conviction should be affirmed, 
because that is exactly what she did * 
Defendant unquestionably blocked the 
doorway by standing in front of it and re-
fusing to move2 The contention that de-
fendant simply took "the only position she 
could assume while conversing with the of-
ficers" (ante, p 419) is undercut by the 
fact that she spoke with them for several 
minutes without getting out of bed3 
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that 
she did have to stand in the doorway to 
talk to the officers, she should have 
stepped aside when ordered to do so 
The majority objects "Had she com-
plied with the officer's requests and stood 
back from the doorway this in itself would 
have, under the circumstnaces, constituted 
the very consent which she was not re-
quired to give " (Ante, p 419 ) The ob-
jection is not well founded Consent given 
in submission to an assertion of au-
the door, directly in front of the door Q 
Would she have had to move in order for 
jou to get into the premises*> A Yes, sir, 
she would have Q Now, jou felt 
that jou could not walk into the apartment 
without at least walking over her, there 
was no room to walk to the side of her7 
A No, sir, there was not" 
3. "Q At what point in time did [defendant] 
get off the bed' A After she began jelling 
the profanities and we requested several 
times and advised her several times of the 
situation, she then aroused from the bed 
very angrilj " ' Q And after jou first 
knocked on the door and my client was 
awakened how much time elapsed before— 
we have a general ten minute period—how 
much of that ten minutes, approximately, 
before my client got off the bed, fne min-
utes, would that be fair' A Perhaps" 
PEOPLE v. 
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thority is involuntary and without legal ef-
fect (See Bumper v North Carolina 
(1968), 391 U S 543, 548-549, 88 S Ct 
1788, 20 LEd 2d 797, People v Shelton 
(1964), 60 Cal 2d 740, 746, 36 CalRptr 
433, 388 P2d 665, People v Michael 
(1955), 45 Cal 2d 751, 753, 290 P2d 852) 
The question whether a defendant's con 
sent was coerced by a claim of authority is 
to be decided in light of all the facts and 
circumstances (See People v Smith 
(1966), 63 Cal 2d 779, 798, 48 CalRptr 
382, 409 P2d 222, People v Bilderbach 
(1965), 62 Cal 2d 757, 762-763, 44 Cal Rptr 
313, 401 P2d 921, see also People v West 
(1970), 3 Cal 3d 595, 602, 91 CalRptr 385, 
477 P 2d 409 ) Stepping aside could not 
have been construed as anything other than 
submission to an explicit assertion of au-
thority here because, after having been re-
4 "Q Did you ever tell [defendant] to step 
aside so jou could enter*' A Several 
times Q That is after she got off the 
bed and faced tou ' A les sir Q And 
what did she saj or do? A Again jelling 
profanities and asking for a search warrant 
Q How were jou able to get her out of 
your waj "> A Lpon adwsing her numerous 
WETZEL Cal 4 2 1 
P 2d 416 
peatedly refused permission to enter, the 
officers advised defendant a search war-
rant was unnecessary and threatened to ar-
rest her if she did not move 4 
The absence of forceful resistance (ante, 
p 419) is beside the point "[T]he use of 
force is not an element in the violation of 
section 148" (In re Culver (1968), 69 
Cal 2d 898, 905, fn 10, 73 CalRptr 393, 
397, 447 P2d 633, 637) "Unlike section 
834a, which applies only to forceful resist-
ance, section 148 penalizes even passive de-
lay or obstruction of an arrest, such as re-
fusal to cooperate" (People v Curtis 
(1969), 70 Cal 2d 347, 356, £n 6, 74 Cal. 
Rptr 713, 718, 450 P2d 33, 38) 
The conviction should be affirmed. 
McCOMB and BURKE, J J , concur. 
times to mo\e and she refused to, we ad 
vised her that if she didn't move that she 
would be placed under arrest for interfering 
with us in performance of our dutj She 
failed to move We then placed her under 
arrest and began our search of the apart 
ment for the suspect" 
